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Abstract
We study how people's predisposition towards altruism affects their behavior in a voluntary
contributions public good experiment. We investigate whether a high level of contributions
can be sustained in groups of subjects who have been pre−selected on the basis of their
altruistic inclinations. In the first stage of the experiment, each subject responds to a
psychology questionnaire that measures various dimensions of one's personality. The subjects
are then matched in groups according to their altruism scores, and engage in a voluntary
contributions game. We consider whether the levels and dynamics of group contributions
differ significantly between the groups with altruists and non−altruists. We find that subjects'
altruism has only a weak positive effect on group behavior in the public good game.
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1. Introduction 
We study how people's predisposition towards altruism,
1 as measured by tools 
developed by psychologists, affects people’s behavior in a voluntary contributions public 
good experiment. The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) has been widely used by 
economists to study the provision of public goods. Each participant in a typical VCM 
experiment is given a number of tokens which they have to divide between a public and a 
private good. The parameter profile is set so that it is Pareto optimal for all players to 
contribute everything to the public good, but the dominant strategy for each player is to free-
ride and contribute nothing toward the public good provision. Previous experimental results 
indicate that the strong free-rider hypothesis is commonly rejected by experimental evidence; 
yet the level of contributions declines with repetition (Davis and Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995). 
A large portion of cooperative behavior cannot be explained by people’s confusion with the 
game and should be attributed to their taste for cooperation (Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and 
Prisbrey, 1997). Andreoni (1995) further suggests that the decline in contributions in the later 
periods of experiments is due to people’s frustrated attempt at cooperation, rather than 
learning the free-riding incentives. 
We investigate whether a high level of contributions can be sustained in groups of 
subjects who have been pre-selected on the basis of their altruistic inclinations. A number of 
recent studies consider the underlying preferences or values that might lead an individual to 
be more or less likely to contribute (Offerman et al., 1996; Roelofs and Sigler, 1998). These 
studies do not consider behavior in groups of subjects with similar value orientations. This is 
the task we undertake in our paper. In the first stage of our experiment, each subject responds 
to a psychology questionnaire that measures various dimensions of one's personality. The 
subjects are then matched in groups according to their altruism scores, and engage in a 
voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. We consider whether the levels and 
dynamics of group contributions differ significantly between the groups of altruists and non-
altruists. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Five sessions, with 15 subjects each, were conducted at the University of Melbourne. 
Each session consisted of two parts, both computerized.
2 In the first part, the participants 
completed the Personal Meaningful Profile (PMP) questionnaire developed by Wong (1998). 
The questionnaire is composed of 57 questions that measure one’s personality along several 
dimensions; each question is measured on 7-point scale, form 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). 
The following nine questions were used to calculate each person’s score for relationship, 
which was used as a proxy for altruism:  
10   I care about other people  
18   I relate well to others  
27   I have a number of good friends  
28   I am trusted by others  
32   I am highly regarded by others  
                                                            
1 Here we do not distinguish between “altruism” (utility-interdependency) and “warm-glow” (utility from the act 
of contributing). We use the term altruism to denote people’s general taste for cooperation, referred to as 
“kindness” by Andreoni (1995). 
2 We are grateful to Jim Dang for developing a computerized version of the PMP questionnaire. The Arizona 
Science Laboratory software was used to conduct the VCM game.   3 
41   I am altruistic and helpful  
42  I am liked by others  
45   I bring happiness to others  
50   I contribute to the well being of others  
The PMP is a relatively new instrument, but it has been shown to be high in both reliability 
and validity (Wong, 1998). For the relationship sub-scale used in this study, the reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) is .81. While no validity studies have been done on the sub-
scales independently, the relationship sub-scale is high in content validity for altruism. The 
instrument allows for an unobtrusive assessment of altruism, as well as other personality 
factors that are potentially relevant to selfless actions. 
In the second part of the experiment, the subjects in each session were matched into 
three groups of five based on their altruism scores, and participated in 20 periods of a 
standard VCM game. No explanation was given on how the subjects were matched in groups, 
and no communication was allowed. The three-group design was employed to increase the 
difference in scores between altruistic and non-altruistic groups and to improve score 
homogeneity within groups.
3 In each period of VCM each participant had to allocate 50 
tokens between a private and a public fund. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) was set 
at 0.4.
4 The average total pay out per participant was $19 (Australian dollars). 
 
3. Results 
Among the 75 participants, the individual altruism scores ranged from 36 to 63, with a 
mean of 49.04, and a standard deviation of 5.71. Individual contributions to the public fund 
ranged from 0  to 100%, with a mean per period per subject of 39.5%, and a standard 
deviation of 34.8%. Figure 1 and table 1 summarize the group data. The most “altruistic” 
groups are indexed by “A”, intermediate score groups are indexed by “B”, and the least 
“altruistic” groups are indexed by “C”.  
First note that the levels and dynamics of VCM games were consistent with previous 
experimental evidence. Average group contributions ranged between 17.7% to 63.9%, with 
the mean of 39.5%. Also in accordance with previous findings, group contributions declined 
from the first ten to the last ten periods in 13 out of 15 groups.  
Consider the relationship between the “altruism” scores and levels of contribution in 
VCM.  From figure 1 and the summary row of table 1, we observe that, overall, the average 
contributions of “altruistic” groups “A” are above the average contributions of  “non-
altruistic” groups “C” (45.3% and 38.7% of endowments, respectively). However, this 
relationship is not consistent across all sessions: while in sessions 1-3 the “altruists” 
contributed on average more than “non-altruists”, the opposite is true for sessions 4 and 5.  
                                                            
3 We initially conducted three 10-person sessions dividing the subjects into two groups. We observed no 
differences in the contributions of higher-score and lower-score groups; see Ma et al. (2000).  
4 See Ledyard (1995) for a detailed explanation of MPCR.   4 
 
                 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
    Figure 1. Dynamics of group averages.         
                5 
Table 1. Summary of experimental results 
 
Session score     Group score    Group contribution, % 
Mean Min  Max     First  10 Last  10 
  










period  periods periods 
Rate of 
change 
Group 1A     56.8  52  63     63.9  64.8 71.7  56.1  -0.76 
Group 1B    52.4 49  55    50.2 62  50  50.4 -1.83 
Group 1C 
51.53 39  63 
   45.4  39  48     19.7  34.4 25.8  13.6  -0.86 
Group 2A     50.8  48  55     47.8  41.6  48.6  47  -0.15 
Group 2B    46.4 45  48    48.9 76.8 60.4  37.2  -2.04 
Group 2C 
46.8 42  55 
   43.2  42  44     26.5  38.8 37.2  15.8  -1.83 
Group 3A     51.8  48  58     44.8  42.4 50.5  39.2  -1.36 
Group 3B    43.4 42  45    37 61.2  47.6 26.4 -1.16 
Group 3C 
44.8 36  58 
   39.2  36  41     41  50.1  49.5  32.4  -2.25 
Group 4A     56.2  55  58     29.4  33.6 34.1  24.6  -0.61 
Group 4B    52 50 54    17.7 20  23  12.4 -0.93 
Group 4C 
52.2 38  58 
   48.4  38.4  49     45  48.8 53.2  36.7  -0.91 
Group 5A     56  52  62     40.8  39.2  45.8  35.7  -0.76 
Group 5B    49.6 47  51    18.3 24.4 24.7  12  -1.28 
Group 5C 
49.87 39  62 
   44  39  46     61.6  73.2  58.6  64.6  -0.17 
Group A 
pooled   
54.3 48  63    45.3 44.3 50.1  40.5  -0.73 
Group B 
pooled   
48.8 42  55    34.4 48.9 41.1  27.7  -1.45 
Group C 
pooled 
49.04 36  63 
  
44 36 49      38.7 49.1 44.9 32.6  -1.2 
 
Note: In session 1, due to a subject assignment error, the minimal score is group 1A was below the maximal 
score in group 1B. Still, importantly, the gap in scores between the “A” and the “C” group remained positive. 
 
According to the Mann-Whitney test, the average contributions in the  “A” groups were 
higher than in the “C” groups at the significance level of 27.4% only (one-sided).
5 We also 
note that, surprisingly, in three out of five sessions (sessions 3-5), the first period contribution 
of the “non-altruistic” group was higher than that of the “altruistic” group.  
Although the groups were ranked by their scores within each session, a perfect 
ranking of “altruistic” and “non-altruistic” groups could not be guaranteed across sessions: 
for example, the mean score of the “intermediate” group 1B was higher than the mean score 
of the “altruistic” group 3A. To address this problem, we considered correlation between the 
group scores and group contributions, with each group taken as an independent observation 
(15 observations total). The results are presented in table 2. Generally there is a weak positive 
correlation between both average and maximum scores and contributions, except for the first 
period contributions.  However, none of the correlation coefficients are statistically 
significant according to the t-test. 
                                                            
5 An alternative test is to compare the group contributions in 5 top ranking by score groups (across sessions) 
with those in 5 lowest ranking groups. According to the Mann-Whitney test, the null hypothesis of no 
differences is sustained at 42.1% significance level (one-sided).   6 
Table 2. Correlation between group scores and average per person contribution in a group 
 





First ten periods 
contribution 
Last ten periods 
contribution 
Per period rate of 
change  
Average group score  0.112 -0.244  0.037  0.169  0.421 
Min. group score  -0.004  -0.262 -0.059  0.043  0.268 
Max. group score  0.208  -0.186 0.135  0.257  0.420 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation between individual scores and contributions  
 





First ten periods 
contribution 
Last ten periods 
contribution 
Per period rate of 
change 
Individual score  0.07  -0.097 -0.004  0.138  0.155 
 
Correlation was generated for the individual scores as well. As can be seen from table 
3 the relationship here is also extremely weak.  
We next turn to the relationship between the altruism scores and the dynamics of 
group contributions. The average per period rates of change in contributions and the 
corresponding correlation coefficients are displayed in the last columns of tables 1-3. 
Consistently with our conjecture, we observe that, overall, the contributions in “altruistic” 
groups declined slower than those in “non-altruistic” groups; the rate of change in 
contributions was 0.73 percentage points per period in groups “A”, as compared to 1.20 
percentage points in groups “C”.  The correlation coefficients between the rate of change in 
contributions and the average and maximal group scores are 0.421 and 0.420, respectively 
(table 2); both are significant at 10% level according to the t-test (one-sided). The Mann-
Whitney test shows that the rate of contributions decline in altruistic A-groups was lower 
than in non-altruistic C-groups at 11.1% level (one-sided). We conclude that the relationship 
between the scores and the rates of contribution change was noticeable overall, but there was 
still a significant heterogeneity in this respect across sessions.  
 
4. Discussion 
The results show that there is only a weak relationship between people’s altruistic 
predisposition, as measured by the PMP questionnaire, and their behavior in public good 
VCM games. We find that overall “altruistic” groups displayed a higher level of contributions 
than “non-altruistic” groups; however, the difference between the two types of groups was 
not statistically significant. “Altruistic” groups exhibited a slower rate of decrease in 
contributions than “non-altruistic” groups. Still, contributions of all groups declined with 
repetition. In contrast with our conjecture, we find that higher altruism did not result in higher 
contributions in the first period of the VCM; this may be due to subjects’ initial confusion 
with the game. The results suggest that, at least for inexperienced subjects, the underlying 
values do not affect the level of contributions as such, but they may influence the contribution 
dynamics. 
   7 
There may be several reasons why altruism, as measured by the PMP questionnaire, 
did not prove significant in explaining behavior in the VCM game. First, this may be due to 
insufficient variance in altruism scores between “altruistic” and “non-altruistic” groups. 
Further research is necessary to investigate whether increasing the gap in altruism scores 
between altruist and non-altruist groups would result in a stronger relationship between 
underlying values and behavior in the VCM game. Second, it is possible that direct screening 
instruments, such as the PMP questionnaire that we use, are less effective in measuring 
people’s values than alternative indirect instruments. Offerman et al. (1996) use an incentive 
compatible instrument to measure subjects’ value orientations, and find significant 
differences in the behavior of subjects with different values in step-level public goods 
experiments.
6 Finally, people’s altruism, as opposed to reciprocity or taste for fairness, may 
not play a large role in voluntary contributions games. Psychology research shows that 
personality measures have at best low correlation with behavior in particular tasks, unless the 
personality measures are tailored to this task (e.g., Mischel, 1990).  
 
It would be interesting be to compare the behavior of subjects sorted on the basis of 
altruism as measured in this study, with the behavior of subjects sorted on the basis of some 
other individual difference measure.  This could be a measure of trust, taste for fairness, 
belief in reciprocity, or actual past behavior. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) show that fairness and reciprocity can be used to explain behavior in public 
good and other games. Gunnthorsdottir et al. (1999) demonstrate that subjects may be 
effectively sorted into cooperators and free-riders on the basis of their first period 
contributions in the VCM. In contrast, our results show no correlation between individuals' 
altruism scores and their first-period contributions. Gunnthorsdottir et al. further report that 
sorting subjects in groups based on their past contributions improves group contribution 
dynamics. These authors interpret cooperation as coming from self-interested reciprocity 
rather than altruism.  It is then quite possible that contributions in public good experiments 
are driven by self-interest at least as much as by underlying taste for cooperation. Comparing 
behavior of subjects sorted into groups on the basis of altruism scores with those sorted on 
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